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Recently several countries, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania 
and Slovakia, have at least partially reversed their earlier moves towards compulsory 
defined-contribution schemes. This paper concentrates on Poland, which just reduced 
contributions going to the mandatory second pillar from 7.3 to 2.3% of earnings with that 
amount diverted to the public pension regime (ZUS).  
 
Trying to solve the problem of public finance sustainability by radically shrinking the second 
tier of the pension system has obvious costs in terms of poverty among old-age pensioners. 
Their incomes will fall sharply relative to those of working-age population. Partially reversing 
pension reform will also cost Poland in terms of risk spreading and capital market 
development. It will also undermine the population’s trust in the system. There is no 
alternative for achieving public finance sustainability but to restrain current spending and/or 
raise taxes. The pensionable age should be raised further (probably to 70 by mid-century), 
even in the general scheme, to deal with the long-run demographic challenge and be 
equalized across the two sexes. The authorities should move to unify pension provision 
systems, in particular by phasing out the farmers’ regime (KRUS) and making pensions for 
miners and others with special regimes closer to actuarially neutral. 
 











Starting in 2010 debate began in Poland about whether the existing retirement income 
system was functioning as well as its original designers had hoped when they overhauled it 
in the late 1990s. Dissatisfaction emanated from a variety of sources, and criticisms followed 
several lines. Early on the main concern was that it was wasteful, since a new layer of 
management and administration had been interposed between the pensioner and his/her 
savings in the “open pension funds” (OFEs, using the Polish acronym), to the extent that 
such funds invested a large share of their portfolios in the form of government bonds, and the 
government itself was in deficit and thus having to issue those bonds merely to finance its 
deficit, a large part of which is attributable to making the necessary transfers to the OFEs. 
Over time the terrain shifted somewhat, and the emphasis focused increasingly on the 
burden on the public finances in view of the proximity of the ceilings for government debt of 
55 and 60% of GDP inscribed in law and the constitution, respectively. Opinions differed 
within the government and even within the majority party (PO) as to what changes should be 
made, but a formal proposal finally came out only over the end-year holidays (no mention 
had been made of it in the 2011 budget discussions in the autumn). The package entailed:  
 
•  a reduction in the contributions going to the OFEs from 7.3 to 2.3% of earnings (with     
a recovery to 3.5% from 2013 to 2017), with that amount diverted to the public 
pension regime (ZUS);  
•  keeping the 5% in separate accounts that would earn returns based on GDP growth 
rather than the economy-wide wage bill as for the ordinary first pillar; and  
•  tax cuts for optional third-pillar retirement saving.  
 
The package was sent to the parliament and passed through it with very little discussion nor 
official analysis, the government arguing that it wanted to put the new system in place as 
soon as possible in order to stop paying out those funds to the OFEs and safeguard its fiscal 
position. In the end the opposition to the change came mainly from economists and jurists 
who were concerned about the implications for the safety and security of both the funds 





system from the reversal, the likely shallowing out of financial markets and the fall in the 
prices to be achieved for future privatisations of state-owned companies and the ability of the 
government to put off reforms that would deal more fundamentally with the problem of 
unsustainable public finances. Parliament quickly passed the bill, then within a few weeks the 
President signed it, and it took effect on 1 May 2011. 
This paper will describe the different kinds of pension systems used in OECD countries
1. It 
will then review the pension situation in Poland in the period prior to the 1999 reform. Next it 
will describe the key features of that reform and its impact before moving on to discuss more 
recent outcomes and developments, especially with regard to pension adequacy. 
Subsequently, it will look forward to the longer-term outlook for an unchanged system, with a 
particular focus on the public finances. Finally, it will briefly discuss the impact of the 2011 
reform reversal before drawing conclusions and making recommendations. 
 




Public old-age pensions come in different forms. Most countries have some sort of minimum, 
basic fixed or means-tested safety-net pensions. Then a majority have a defined-benefit or –
contribition system that is income-related. Variants are sometimes, as in Poland’s case, 
called “notional defined contribution” systems, while others are based on points. Then, many 
countries have mandatory second-pillar regimes, which are located in the private sector and 
are funded. Finally, tax incentives may encourage optional retirement saving in third-pillar 
vehicles. A summary of these systems is given in Table 1. More information is available in 
OECD (2009, 2011). A discussion of the merits of different systems may be found in Barr 
and Diamond (2009). 
                                                      
1 This paper is based on a presentation made at the CASE/BRE Bank Seminar on 24 March 2011. The author is 
Head of Division in the Country Studies Branch of the Economics Department. He would like to thank Hervé 
Boulhol, Balazs Egert, Monika Queisser and Edward Whitehouse for useful discussions, but any errors are his 








Table 1: Structure of retirement-income provision 
 
Country   Public  Public  Private  Country Public  Public  Private 









OECD countries  Netherlands     x        DB 
Australia  x           DC  New 
Zealand 
   x          
Austria           DB     Norway        x  NDC  DC 
Belgium  x     x  DB     Poland        x  NDC  DC 
Canada  x  x     DB     Portugal        x  DB    
Chile  x     x     DC  Slovakia        x  Points  DC 
Czech 
Republic 
   x  x  DB     Slovenia        x  DB    
Denmark  x  x        DC  Spain        x  DB    
Estonia     x     Points  DC  Sweden        x  NDC  DC 
Finland        x  DB     Switzerland  x     x  DB  DB  
France        x  DB+ 
points 
   Turkey        x  DB    
Germany  x        Points     UK  x  x  x  DB    
Greece        x  DB     US           DB    
Hungary           DB  DC  Other major economies 
Iceland  x  x        DB  Argentina     x     DB    
Ireland     x           Brazil           DB    
Israel     x        DC  China     x     NDC/
DC 
  
Italy  x        NDC     India           DB + 
DC 
  
Japan     x     DB     Indonesia           DC    
Korea  x  x     DB     Russia     x     NDC  DC 
Luxembourg  x  x x DB      Saudi 
Arabia 
      x  DB    
Mexico        x     DC  South 
Africa 
x             
Note: In Iceland and Switzerland, the governemnt sets contribution rates, minimu rates of return and the annuity 
rate at which the accumulation is converted into a pension for mandatory occupational plans. These schemes are 
therefore implicitely defined benefits.  
DB = defined benefit; DC = defined contribution; NDC = notional accounts 
 











Before Poland reformed its former defined-benefit system it was spending around 10-15% of 
its GDP on public pensions (depending on the precise definition, that is whether or not 
disability pensions are included), perhaps the highest share in the OECD (Table 2 and Figure 
1). That outlay represented a quarter of general government expenditure, compared to an 
OECD average of about a sixth. The system was extremely generous, with an observed 
gross replacement rate
2 of more than 60%, even though that figure was slightly lower than 
where it had been earlier in the decade. The theoretical full-career replacement rate was 
65%.  
In terms of the age of eligibility for an old-age pension Poland was not unusual, neither with 
reference to the average of other OECD countries, nor in the fact that the female entitlement 
age was lower (by five years) than the corresponding age for men (Table 3). But there were 
all kinds of exceptions for certain occupations and for those meeting contribution minima of 
25 or 30 years, with the result that the effective retirement age was 59 years for men and 55 
years for women, compared to OECD averages of 62 and 61 years, respectively. 
 
                                                      
2  The definition of the replacement rate used here is the value of a pension compared to revalued lifetime 
earnings of the pensioner, with revaluation equal to the economy-wide average. In this context we are dealing 
with the average pensioner. The replacement rate thus calculated will be lower than the alternative where the final 
salary is used if earnings are assumed to rise more rapidly over the career than the economy-wide average. See 











Figure 1: Public pension expenditure, 1995, per cent of GDP 
 
Source: OECD (1998). 





Table 3: Standard age of entitlement to public old-age pensions, 1995 
 
Country  Males  Females 
Australia 65  60 
Austria 65  60 
Belgium 60  60 
Canada 65  65 
Czech Republic  60  53-57 
Denmark 67  67 
Finland 65  65 
France 60  60 
Germany 65  65 
Greece 62  57 
Hungary 60  56 
Iceland 67  67 
Ireland 66  66 
Italy 62  57 
Japan 60  58 
Korea 60  60 
Luxembourg 65 65 
Mexico 65  65 
Netherlands 65  65 
New Zealand  62  62 
Norway 67  67 
Poland  65  60 
Portugal 65  62.5 
Spain 65  65 
Sweden 65  65 
Switzerland 65  62 
Turkey 46-60  41-55 
United Kingdom  65  60 
United States  65  65 
 




4.  The 1999 reform 
 
 Key  features 
It was widely recognized that the system was completely unsustainable from a budgetary 
point of view, and a massive reform was legislated in 1998 and implemented in 1999. The 
defined-benefit system was replaced by a system comprising notional defined contribution 
first-pillar plan plus a mandatory system of privately managed pension funds plus a voluntary 
third pillar without tax advantages.
3 The intellectual inspiration for the new system was the 
Swedish model; since then Italy has also adopted a similar set-up. In the first pillar workers 
                                                      
3 Thus, the third pillar has remained small, covering only 775 000 people with accumulated assets of PLN 7.7 







and their employers make earnings-based contributions of 7.3 and 12.2%, respectively, and 
these accrue notional returns based on the growth in the economy-wide wage bill. Upon 
retirement the retiree’s pension rights are annuitized using a formula whereby the 
accumulated pension capital is divided by population-wide average life expectancy at that 
age.  
 
The designers of the reform had intended that the pension entitlement age be standardized 
at 62 for both sexes, but that idea was abandoned by the government in 1998. Later 
consideration was given to just raising the eligibility age for women to the male age (65), but 
that too was never implemented.  
The other key feature of the reform was the enormous reduction (37%, according to OECD 
calculations) in the replacement rates for covered workers. Under the reformed system the 
replacement rate was around 50% in total with about half of that from the first pillar and half 
from the defined-contribution pension funds (using historical average data on investment 
returns). In addition, a contribution ceiling of 2.5 times average earnings was instituted, 
lowering government revenues in the short term by an estimated 0.4% of GDP. 
Redistribution was also eliminated, as replacement rates are constant across the earnings 
distribution. 
 
Despite the radical cut in pension replacement rates the system was still not fully financed by 
contributions. With contributions at 19.52% of earnings ever since the reformed system was 
set up in 1999 (half on the employer and the other half borne by the employee)
4, official 
estimates point to a cumulative cost of 94% of GDP by 2060 (Bielecki, 2011). That took the 
form of annual transfers from the budget to the second-pillar funds that were some 0.7% of 
GDP per year in the early years and were foreseen to peak at about 1.5% of GDP after 
around 15 years. The intent was to deal with the remaining financial imbalance by devoting 
the proceeds of privatisation to the pension system. But even though such asset sales had 
generated over PLN 100 billion by end-2010, that was far less than the government’s 
transfers to the OFEs (some PLN 156 billion). 
                                                      
4 This is precisely the OECD average total contribution rate (OECD, 2011, p. 153), though far lower than what is 





  OECD assessment at the time 
The OECD judged the reform as likely to be highly successful. The economy was expected 
to benefit from greater diversity of pension income sources, higher national saving, later 
retirement, a smaller underground economy and, last but not least, deeper capital markets 
(and thus easier privatization). Most of these expectations have not been disappointed, 
though low national saving rates have persisted over the past decade. Our advice to the 
government was to closely monitor the new pension funds, to unify the retirement age across 
the sexes and to unify first-pillar rules and regulations across different regimes, with 
exceptions allowed only in medically justifiable cases. 
  Pension reforms elsewhere 
Sixteen other OECD countries were also reforming their pension systems in one way or 
another at around that time, mostly also with a view to cutting replacement rates so as to 
improve financial sustainability. The average reduction in lifetime benefits over these reforms 
was 22% for men and 25% for women. Poland’s reform made its system like those of 
Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Turkey in that all have no progressivity 
(Table 4). However, compared to these countries it can be seen that its common 
replacement rate across the earnings distribution is fairly low; only Germany’s and Slovakia’s 
are lower. On the other hand looking only at the high earners the 75% rate is relatively high. 
 
Table 4: Gross and net replacement rates under pre- and post-reform rules, in 
percentage 
 
  Gross replacement rates  Net replacement rates 
  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Pre-reform  Post-reform 
Individual 
earnings:  0.5 1  1.5  0.5 1 1.5 0.5 1 1.5 0.5 1  1.5
Australia  46.2 23.1 15.4  67 41.6 33.1 55.3 30.4 21.8 80.2 53.1 41.8
Austria  90  90 85.9  80.1 80.1 76.4 98.4 99.2 95.1 90.5 90.3 86.3
Belgium  54.8 40.4 31.4  58.1 42 32.5 74.2 62.1 50.6 78.7 63.7 51.7
Czech 
Republic  72.1  45 32.9  79.2 49.7 36.4 86.7 58.1 44.6 95.3 64.1 49.4
Finland  69.9 66.2 65.2  66.5 56.2 56.2 75.9 71.4 72.4 73.2 62.4 63.8
France  64.7 64.7 58.4  61.7 53.3 48.5 79.7 78.2 70.8 76.2 65.7 60.2
Germany  47.9 47.9 46.5  43 43 42.6 56.4 66.6 66.4 59.2 61.3 60.3
Hungary  69.9 57.7 53.6  76.9 76.9 76.9 85.9 83.2 79.1 94.3  105.5 99.2
Italy 90  90  90  67.9 67.9 67.9 99.1 99.1 99.2 74.8  74.8  77.1
Japan  56.5 40.6 35.3  47.1 33.9 29.4 55.8 41 37 51.4 38.7 33.9
Korea  100 69.3  56  64.1 42.1 33.6 105.9 74.9 61.6 68.8 46.6 38.7
Mexico  72.5 72.5 72.5  55.3 36.1 34.5 73.4 76.5 83.2 56  38 39.6







  Gross replacement rates  Net replacement rates 
  Pre-reform  Post-reform  Pre-reform  Post-reform 
New 
Zealand  77.5 38.7 25.8  79.3 41.1 29 77.5 38.7 25.8 79.3 41.1  29
Poland  81.2 62.9 56.8  61.2 61.2 61.2 97.1 76.9 69.7 74.4 74.9  75
Portugal  91.3 89.9 88.5  63.0 53.9 53.1 106.1 112 110.8 73.2 69.6  72
Slovakia  65 58.9 39.3  56.4 56.4 56.4 76.4 75.9 52.2 66.3 72.7 74.9
Sweden  82.5 78.6 76.5  76.6 61.5 75.6 84.5 80.3 81.9 79.3 64.1 81.2
Turkey  107.6 107.6 107.6 86.9 86.9 86.9 150 154.4 157.9 121.2 124.7 127.1
UK  41.1 29.7 20.6  51 30.8 21.3 51.9 39.8 28.3 63.8 40.9 29.2
Source: OECD pension models; see also OECD (2007), Pension at a Glance, Part II.1.  
 
 




A great deal of water has flowed under the bridge since 1999. Policy makers have not 
exactly stood still, even though they have indeed failed to unify the eligibility age across the 
sexes. Most importantly they did manage to shrink the bridge pensions quite radically in 
2009. But that was offset to some extent by earlier backtracking moves: exclusion from the 
standard regime of (i.e. preferential treatment for) the uniformed services (military, police and 
judges) in 2003 and miners in 2004; and higher pension indexation in 2004 and 2007. Also 
notable was the fact that despite the easing of the implicit public pension liabilities the 
European Union’s Maastricht definition of gross public debt trended inexorably upward from 
below 40% until 2001 to above 55% most recently, as true fiscal consolidation (defined as an 
improvement in the underlying primary or non-interest balance of the general government) 
was limited to just a couple of years in the middle of the 2000s (2005 and 2007, to be 
specific). Despite saving some 2 percentage points of GDP in terms of net debt interest 
payments, total government outlays were fairly flat as a share of GDP and revenues if 
anything experienced a slight downtrend. This set the stage for the recent attempts to stave 
off violation of the Polish legal and constitutional limits of 55 and 60% of GDP, respectively, 
in the form of the (domestic definition of) gross government debt, which would bring about a 
series of fairly unpleasant measures. 
 
In that regard ever since Poland joined the EU in 2004 there has been conflict between 
Warsaw (backed up by several other new EU member countries) and Brussels surrounding 
the accounting treatment that should be applied to the second-pillar pension funds. The 





recognised their pension liabilities should be penalised by the European Commission who 
consider the assets of those funds to be in the private sector. The result is that there is a 
significant difference between the standardised (OECD) definition of gross liabilities (64.3% 
of GDP at end-2010), the EU’s Maastricht definition (55.2%) and the national definition, 
which arbitrarily excludes certain funds such as the National Road Fund (53%). A very recent 
IMF paper (Soto et al., 2011) attempts to get around this problem by proposing a new 
“pension-adjusted budget balance”. 
 
In the event there were indeed transfers from the budget to the second-pillar funds (OFEs) 
that reached PLN 22.5 billion in 2010 and cumulatively PLN 156 billion since the system 
began. Since the funds were worth a total of only PLN 221 billion at end-2010
5, the average 
gross returns earned by those funds were meagre, something like 7% per year, compared 
with an average long-term government bond rate of closer to 7% and the 7 ¼ per cent 
indexing for the first pillar (based on the wage bill)  (Bielecki, 2011). The OFEs put some 
30% of their portfolios in equities and were prevented from investing more than 5% in foreign 
assets. In April 2011 this constraint was attacked by EU officials as being an illegal constraint 
on internal capital movements. But, in any case, the stock markets world wide have done 
poorly, especially at the beginning and end of the 2000s.  
 




                                                      
5 At end-1999 pension fund assets were 13.5% of Poland’s GDP, far smaller than the 67.6% OECD weighted 
average. But there about 20 countries with smaller shares, including all the other CEECs (OECD, 2011, page 







But the OFEs were not especially inept in terms of their returns: prior to the crisis their 
performance was best in the region (Schwarz, 2011). Then, in 2008, for example, they lost 
18% on average, an outcome that was not far from what other such funds around the world 
were experiencing (Figure 2). And the correlation with the equities share of total portfolios is 
fairly robust. Most of those experiencing a better average outcome that year had a smaller 
equities share. This is not to say that allocating 100% of pensions fund assets to equities is 
the best strategy, even if it raises expected returns over time, since it would entail huge risks 
being assumed by future pensioners in the event of any unforeseeable stock market 
collapse. For 2009 the sample of countries is less complete, but the performance of Polish 
OFEs was better than most others’, and equities shares no longer played such a clear role 
(Table 5). And in 2010 World Bank figures (Schwarz, 2011) show real returns of around 9%, 
tops in the region. 
 
Table 5. Pension funds’ real investment returns and equities exposure, 2009 
 
Country  Real net investment return Equities share







Simple OECD average  8.92 21.7



























One of the original complaints of the government in the current round of re-examining the 
pension system was their allegedly heavy fees and expenses. The available evidence 
(Figure 3) shows that the OFEs’ were not out of line with those of their foreign counterparts in 
2009, though there was some substantial room for improvement, compared to the best 




6.  The question of pension adequacy 
 
 
One of the key requirements of a good old-age pension system is that it provide adequqte 
pension levels to retirees so that their standard of living is sustained through their senior 
years. Incomes of those over 65 as a percentage of the population average do not have to 
be at 100% for this criterion to be met, however, since older people have fewer material 
                                                      
6 However, it appears that the OECD figures for Poland cover only fees for assets under management, whereas 
so-called “distribution fees” are an order of magnitude greater. Bielecki (2011) shows a time series that starts at 
9.1% of monthly contributions in 2000 and falls to around 6% a few years later and stays there until 2010 when 







needs (they often own their own home, they need fewer durable and semi-durable goods, 
they normally do not have children to support). Indeed, the average OECD country with 
available data showed relative income of older people at 82.4% in the mid-2000s (Figure 4).  
 




At that point Poland’s system was comforting, as their relative incomes were much higher 
(94.7%). Only a few countries were doing better in this dimension. A similar message comes 
from looking at (income) poverty rates (defined as having income less than 50% of the 
median) by age brackets. In many OECD countries the elderly are more likely to be poor 
than the average person (most notably in Korea), but not so in Poland where the elderly 






Figure 5: Income poverty rates by age, mid-2000s 
 
Source: OECD Income-Distribution Database; see OECD (2008), Growing Unequal?, Tables 5.1 and 5.3 
 
It is also known that it is not market incomes of the elderly that assure this outcome: more 
than three-quarters of the income of the elderly is from public transfers, a share exceeded in 
only a few other OECD countries, notably Hungary, France, Slovakia (Figure 6). The 
adequacy issue can also be looked at in terms of what are called replacement rates. These 
can be calculated in either gross or net (after-tax) terms. The message is that in Poland such 
rates are higher than in most other OECD countries for both average and high earners, but 
well below what is found elsewhere for those on low incomes. This is true for both gross and 
net measures (Figure 7; only net shown). For women the outcome is even worse, with the 
net replacement rate at median earnings at 50.7%, compared to an OECD average for men 
of 72%. The corresponding shortfall for low-income women is even larger at nearly 30 
percentage points. Yet another representation of pension adequacy can be provided by 
looking at pension wealth as a multiple of average annual earnings. At less than 7 for Poland 
this is very low (OECD, 2011, p. 60). 







Figure 6: Sources of incomes of older people. Percentage of household disposable 
income, mid-2000s 
Source: OECD Income-Distribution Database 





Figure 7: Net replacement rates 
 
Source: OECD pension models 
 
 




Another important aspect of pension design is the linkage of the entitlement age with life 
expectancy, since that has been rising trend-wise for many generations. Most recently, life 
expectancy at 65 was still relatively low in Poland at 14.5 years for men and 18.8 years for 
women, compared to 16.7 and 20.1 years in the average OECD country (recall that the 
female eligibility age is only 60). The OECD advises its member countries to make the link 
automatic, which few countries have done thus far. But Poland’s combination of notional 
defined-contribution accounts and mandatory defined-contribution pension funds does a 
reasonably good job of providing an indirect linkage, because the former are based on 
lifetime earnings and are thus fairer than final-salary pensions. 







As intimated above governments have the option of making their pension systems 
redistributive by focusing them on the most vulnerable, as Canada, New Zealand and the 
Netherlands do. The problem with that is the savings disincentive effect created. Poland 
eliminated all the redistribution in its system with the 1999 reform, with a constant 
replacement rate across the earnings distribution (as in Italy, Hungary and the Slovakia). 
 
Another feature of good pension-system design is so-called “actuarial neutrality”. That is the 
impact of the system on incentives to retire. Ideally those incentives should be neutral unless 
it can be demonstrated that there are externalities to society in retiring earlier or later. One 
way of looking at such incentives by means of a single summary measure is to derive 
changes in gross pension wealth from working an additional year between ages 60 and 65. 
In the average OECD country this was actually negative for men, indicating the prevalence of 
the problem of having strong financial incentives built into the system to take early 
retirement. Fortunately, in Poland’s case, there is a fairly sizeable pay-off to remaining in 
work, 8th highest in the OECD, at 14.6% of one year’s gross earnings. In after-tax terms the 
return is slightly lower. But Poland’s Czech neighbours have an even stronger incentive to 
continuing to work. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that the incentives are having the 
expected effect, as the effective retirement age in Poland has been rising fairly quickly: from 
2006 to 2010 it rose by four years, reaching 59.6, an age that is still nearly two years 
younger than the EU average, thanks in large part no doubt to the 2009 bridge pension 
reform that excluded the majority of previously eligible occupations from early pension 
eligibility. Yet, there is still a great deal more ground to catch up, since average effective age 
of labour-market exit remains one of the lowest in the OECD (Figure 8), and the participation 
rate for those over 50 was still lower than anywhere else in the OECD (except Turkey) in 
2008, whereas in 1970 Poland had occupied the top spot (OECD, 2011, p. 41). 





Figure 8. Average effective age of labour-market exit and normal pensionable age 
 
 
Finally, the most important pre-requisite for good pension-system design is financial 
sustainability: the ability to maintain the system in its current set-up without politically 
unbearable or economically costly contribution rates or other forms of financing. 
 
8.  Recent moves to reverse pension reform in Central and 




Besides the 2011 reform in Poland, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia have all at least partially 
reversed their earlier moves towards compulsory defined-contribution schemes.
7  All had 
previously had pay-as-you go first pillars with contribution rates varying from 9% of payroll (in 
Slovakia) to 25.5% in Hungary, along with compulsory second-pillar funds and voluntary 
                                                      
7
 Going beyond OECD Member countries, partial or complete reversals have also been implemented in Latvia, 







schemes that covered a small minority of the working-age population. All were transferring 
funds from the State’s receipts of workers’ contributions to the funds at the same time as 
they were running annual deficits. Briefly, the Hungarian government has been the most 
radical, effectively nationalising the mandatory 2nd pillar so as to improve its short-term 
financial situation. The result, according to OECD calculations (Whitehouse, 2011), is that all 
reversals will cut the value of pensions, even though they will raise the value of the public 
pension component. Estonia suspended its contributions to the second pillar in the second 
half of 2009 and the whole of 2010 before phasing them back in this year and next, saving up 
to 1% of GDP last year. The motivation was to satisfy requirements to entire the euro area. 
Finally, Poland’s Slovak neighbours temporarily allowed 2nd-pillar participants to move back 
to the 1st pillar (less than 10% did) and then made participation voluntary for all new labour 
market entrants (only 2% have taken up the option to participate). Our calculations 
(Whitehouse, 2011) show that total pensions for retiring Poles on average earnings will fall 
22% following the reversal, similar to the cut in Hungary (21%), greater than the decline 
predicted in Slovakia (10%), but less than the slash expected in Estonia (29%). The result 
will be gross replacement rates for men of 59% and for women of 43%, again better than 
Estonia’s 41% but well below the 58% in Slovakia and the 76% in Hungary. 
 




A few years ago the European Commission projected pension expenditure out to 2060 for all 
EU member countries. Their projections were given for a 50-year horizon and showed Polish 
public pensions at 8.8% of GDP at the end (that is the dark blue bar on the left in Figure 9), 
lowest in the EU after Estonia.  
 
Without changes in the system that would have been 25% of GDP, the highest in the EU. 
The reasons for this huge saving are two-fold: first, Poles are assumed to lengthen their 
working lives more than anybody else in the EU; and, second, there are what is labelled as 
“other savings”, which comprise the introduction of the second-pillar OFEs and reduced first-
pillar pension levels. Indeed, their projections show the benefit ratio of first-pillar pensions 
falling from nearly 60% in 2010 to 23.6% in 2060. The ability to hold down such spending is 





(those over 65 compared to those of working age) is projected to rise by 50 percentage 
points from 2007 to 2060, a jump exceeded only by the deterioration in Slovakia. And, 
despite that handicap, Poland was expected to cut public pension spending by around 3 
percentage points of GDP over that horizon, when no other EU member country was seen to 
manage a cut of even 1 percentage point and the unweighted mean was an increase of 
around 3 points or more. Besides the saving to the public purse coming from the introduction 
of the OFEs, the reason for the surprising saving is that the value of public pensions was 
slashed under the reformed system. Indeed, according to Chlon-Dominczak and Stachura 
(2007), the benefit ratio cut would save 7.5 percentage points of GDP in 2050 relative to the 
2005 outcome. The total benefit ratio would have been 37.6%, a cut of some 37% (compared 
to cuts of 20% for Estonia, 26% for Hungary and 50% for Slovakia). 











  The impact on government finances 
One of the key determinants of what will happen to public pension finances in the longer term 
is what happens to the revalorisation factor relative to the effective interest rate on 
government debt. That is because the government is effectively borrowing from workers 
during their working lives and incurring implicit commitments to pay future first-pillar 
pensions. If it borrows at a low rate of implicit interest, relative to actual market rates, then it 
is making a good deal, and, conversely, if it pays too much, it is making a bad deal, even 
though implicit and explicit debt are not equivalent (because of the government’s ability to 
levy taxes and the welfare improvement that comes from increased old-age security (Barr 
and Diamond, 2009). The revalorisation factor for the first pillar in Poland is the growth rate 
of the average wage bill. The evolution of that series along with the long-term government 
bond rate are provided below (Figure 10). The average shortfall of revalorisation compared 
to the bond rate has been ¾ percentage point, so it seems that it has been a good deal for 






But the five percentage points that are being taken back from the OFEs are being treated 
differently in terms of revalorisation. Those contributions will be linked to nominal GDP 
growth. And in the past decade or so this has risen on average one quarter of a percentage 
point faster than the level of the long-term bond rate. In other words this revalorisation 
method seems more generous than the one based on the wage bill. That is because the 
income distribution has been shifting away from labour and towards capital.  
 
Figure 10. Pension revalorisation has been lower than the cost of government 
borrowing thus far 
 
Source: OECD 
  The impact of the 2011 reform reversal 
As we know, the government decided that it could no longer afford the considerable transfers 
being made to the OFEs in the context where it had to face consolidating public finances so 
as to avoid government debt reaching the 55% of GDP threshold that requires automatic 
cutbacks.  







The government’s social security institution (ZUS) and the Ministry of Finance have modelled 
the expected evolution of pension finances over the next 50 years with and without the 
reversal. According to the numbers presented in the 2009 European Commission 
sustainability report, if no policy changes had been made, public debt would have reached 
318% of GDP by 2060. To prevent that from happening, the structural primary balance would 
have to be permanently tightened by 3.2 percentage points of GDP in the long term while still 
meeting the Maastricht debt target of 60% of GDP. The government’s proposed shift of 
contributions from the OFEs to the first pillar will reduce that shortfall to 2.4% of GDP; 
according to Bielecki (2011) the cost of the pension transition was lowered by 50 percentage 
points of GDP (from 94 to 44%). In more figures made public that I have not shown the time 
series of that improvement shows it to be greatest in the short term and then waning but 
without disappearing entirely. This seems counter-intuitive: indeed, Schwarz (2011) shows 
that full dismantling of the second pillar will generate savings for the public system only until 
around 2040 for a prototypical country in the region, with extra costs of some 1.5% of GDP 
thereafter. Moreover, it is unclear if the official simulation results properly take into account 
the probability that more poor retirees will be pushed into the safety-net pension as a result 
of the reduced benefit ratio and of the revenue costs of the incentives being offered for 
voluntary third-pillar saving. The OECD intends to examine this question in its next Economic 
Survey of Poland that should be published around March 2012 (OECD, 2012). In any case, 
as Barr and Diamond (2009) have emphasized, such a move inevitably redistributes from 
future to present generations, even if it increases inter-generational risk sharing. But 
government officials do admit that even before the latest changes gross replacement rates 
(in relation to final salary) will be much reduced for cohorts born more recently than for 
today’s retirees due to demographic ageing (Bielecki, 2011).
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8 Those born in 1951 could have expected replacement rates of 63% for men and 53% for women, while those 
born in 1990 would get merely 31% and 24%. Government estimates are that its tax incentives for voluntary 










•  Trying to solve the problem of public finance sustainability by radically shrinking the 
second tier of the pension system has obvious costs in terms of poverty among old-
age pensioners. Their incomes will fall sharply relative to those of working-age Poles, 
with replacement rates of around 50%, compared to 58% in Slovakia and 76% in 
Hungary (only Estonia at 41% among those fully or partly reversing reforms is worse).  
•  Partially reversing pension reform will also cost Poland in terms of risk spreading and 
capital market development (including prices received for future privatisations). It will 
also undermine the population’s trust in the system, since the first pensions paid by 
the OFEs have just started to be paid. 
•  There is no alternative for achieving public finance sustainability but to restrain 
current spending and/or raise taxes, preferably by eliminating tax expenditures (on 
farming activities, the lump-sum income tax, social security contributions of the self-
employed), establishing market-value based property taxes, taxing capital gains on 
rented properties and raising taxes on environmental externalities such as through a 
carbon tax.  
•  The pensionable age should be raised further (probably to 70 by mid-century), even 
in the general scheme, to deal with the long-run demographic challenge and 
equalized across the two sexes (as Estonia is doing by 2016). While Poland is one of 
ten of the pre-2010 30 OECD Member countries that maintains a lower age for 
women than men, the number of such countries has already shrunk from 13 and is 
scheduled to drop to six by 2020, five by 2030 and three by 2040 (only Switzerland 
and Turkey still have no plans to eliminate the gap, and they will be only 1 and 22 
years, respectively). Indeed, the lower age is not really an unqualified blessing for 
women themselves, since the result is substantially lower replacement rates. 
•  The authorities should move to unify pension provision systems, in particular by 
phasing out the farmers’ regime (KRUS) and making pensions for miners and others 







•  The OFEs should not be blamed for poor investment performance (which is not out of 
line with that of their foreign peers), but regulate their management fees based on 
international comparisons (recognising that lower charges may mean less in the way 
of sales efforts and service) and allow them to invest more abroad to gain the benefits 
of portfolio diversification, scale economies and low transactions costs that the 
financial markets in more developed countries can generate (Kotlikoff, 1999). 
•  Care should be taken in designing the details of the tax support for voluntary, third-
pillar pension saving so as to avoid adding to regressivity, since the poorest workers 
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